by Henry
Sturman
Abstract
In this article I examine the question whether there exists an objectively correct morality from which (libertarian) rights follow. I argue that although morality is firstly a subjective emotion it does have important objective aspects about which people can argue in a meaningful way and I reject moral relativism. Good arguments can be made that the libertarian morality is better than any alternatives, but a proof of the correctness of libertarianism is impossible. I also introduce the term moral ratio to clarify dilemmas in exceptional "lifeboat situations." Furthermore, I discuss libertarian strategy, the debate between consequentialist libertarians and moralist libertarians, the relation between morality and utilitarianism, and how to apply libertarianism to controversial issues, such as copyrights, abortion and pollution.
Rollins argues in “The Myth of Natural Rights” [1] that fundamental rights, as opposed to rights enforceable through the existing system of justice, are a myth and that morality is nothing but a bag of intelectual tricks designed to influence the behavior of others. He calls himself an amoralist. He claims that an objectively true morality cannot be proved. Therefore, according to Rollins, fundamental morality-based rights, such as natural rights, are a fiction and all moral arguments are nonsensical. I believe Rollins is presenting us with a false dichotomy here. I agree with him that there is no provable correct morality. But I do not agree that it follows that the concept of fundamental human rights, based on morality, is a nonsensical fiction. On the contrary, the existence of morality and its for human society seems crystal clear. In this article I shall argue that meaningful discussion about morality is possible.
What is morality? If one takes a look at how the concepts moral, immoral, morality, etc. are expressed in the language, culture and behavior of people, then it seems to me that the description of morality which best fits its meaning is as follows: Morality is a human emotion with regard to the approval or disapproval of people's behavior toward each other. My position here is largely equal to the emotivism of, for example, Ayer [2] and of van Glabbeek [3]. A moral emotion can be approving, such as when Peter pays the baker for his bread (others approve), or disapproving, such as when Peter steals the baker's bread (others disapprove).
A moral emotion is generally much stronger in situations we disapprove of than in situations we approve of. The negative moral emotion we have about things other people do which we judge to be immoral, such as murder, rape, theft, lying, cheating, etc. is generally much stronger than any positive moral feeling we might have about things other people do which we find morally acceptable, such as talking, working, riding a bicycle, etc. In cases where someone acts morally while it's to his own disadvantage, our positive moral feeling about that person becomes stronger. I believe that a negative (or positive) moral feeling is one of the fundamental human emotions, together with sadness, happiness, anger, fear, despair, shame, shyness, irritation, humor, jealousy, etc. I would say that a negative moral feeling is close to the emotion of anger. However, anger is usually an impulsive feeling one gets when someone has done something specifically wrong, especially in one's own social environment. And a disapproving moral judgement is more likely to be part of a long term intellectual system of values regarding certain issues.
Although morality is in first instance an individual emotion, it is something people can think and debate about. Thoughts and insights in turn can lead to a change in moral feelings in people. Because of the desirability of a harmonious and pleasant society it is of great importance to strive for a situation where people's general moral ideas are equal. The question that pops up at this time is whether there exists an objectively true morality which people should abide by.
I believe that statements in the area of morality and rights cannot possess an objective correctness comparable to laws of nature. This is due to the fact that morality and rights are artificial rules, created by people as a kind of extension to the laws of physics. If one only takes into account the objective laws of physics then one can conclude that the only truly existing law amongst people is the law of the jungle: the strongest person gets his way. For in the final analysis everybody is free to do as he chooses, free to kill, steal, etc., as long as he is not stopped by the laws of gravity, the force of other people, or other physical things. Since rights are invented and implemented by people we should conclude that we cannot, either through observation or arguments about reality, find objectively true rules of morality. Moral rules are based on esthetic preferences of individual people. Inherent in that observation is that morality will differ among people en that one cannot deduce an objectively true morality.
Having said that, in this article I do aim to defend the position that one can give good arguments for a certain morality, more precisely for the libertarian morality. Even though we cannot determine which morality is objectively true, morality still does have certain objective aspects and one can argue on the basis of reasonable standards that one morality is better than another, more specifically that libertarianism is better than other moralities. I wish to note that in this article I use the words rights and morality somewhat interchangeably. The reason is that I think generally people strive for rights which they deem to be just, and therefore moral. "I feel he has no right to do that" means about the same as "what he did was immoral". So I assume that in general language rights and morality usually refer to approximately the same concept, although I will discuss some differences later on.
Since morality is an emotion, one can say that morality is subjective. Moral feelings will differ among different people. The statement “murder is immoral” is just as true in a sense as the statement “murder is moral”. Because if one says “murder is immoral” than that is really short for “it is my opinion that murder is immoral”. And that is a true statement, since it is true that that is my opinion. And if Peter says “murder is moral”, then that is short for “it is my opinion that murder is moral” and that is also a true statement, assuming it's true that's Peter's opinion.
Not only do upbringing, culture, history, thinking and social context have an influence on somebody's morality, but I also believe one's character in part determines someone's morality. I think someone will tend to be more sympathetic to another's act if he can imagine that he might have done the same thing in the same situation. A judge who is always in control of himself may tend to judge a crime of passion just as harshly as a cold blooded murder, thinking murder is murder. On the other hand, a judge who could imagine that he himself might, in moment of great anger and jealousy, kill his wife's lover and have terribly regrets about it later, may have more empathy for the killer and tend to punish him lighter.
I also have a theory that a ban on drugs, infidelity, homosexuality, porn, etc. does not arise so much from the wish of some to protect others against themselves, but more from a wish of some to protect themselves against themselves. The reason a conservative desires to live in a society where all bodily sins are forbidden is not so much to protect his fellow human being against these sins. He wishes to live in a society where he knows that he himself will be heavily punished if he commits any of these sins, as a method of abolishing temptation from his own life.
The fact that morality is first of all a subjective feeling doesn't mean it's useless to debate moral questions. Even if morality is for a large part based on intuition and subjective thoughts and feelings, it is part of the nature of people that they can think about, talk about, read about and argue about the logic and other aspects of morality. Because of insights which may arise from these activities, someone may change his morality which in turn will cause his moral emotions to adapt to his new morality. In general people can provide reasons why they consider some act to be moral or immoral. It is not the case that Peter might say “I think A is moral because I have the emotion that A is moral” and then John says: “I think A is immoral because I have the emotion that A is immoral”, and then all meaningful discussion ends. On the contrary, it is possible to discuss morality on a level where you can hope to convince others on the basis of reasonable, even objective, arguments. Those arguments might demonstrate the consequences of certain principles, or one can analyze what it means to take a certain moral position, one can compare moral positions with one another and one can argue what follows from certain moral principles. Furthermore, one can show that certain moral positions are consistent with one another, or inconsistent. And in general one can give a list of advantages and disadvantages of certain moral principles. So even though there is a subjective element of morality, there are enough objective aspects of morality to talk about, write about, argue about, etc. in a meaningful way.
On one hand there are people like Rollins, who say that morally defendable rights are a fiction and only indicate a purely subjective opinion and on the other hand there are people like Ayn Rand who claim that libertarian morality objectively follows from A=A [4]. I think both are wrong. One cannot prove libertarianism objectively or deduce it from a fundamentally true principle. On the other hand, morality is not totally subjective, since it has important objective aspects. Therefore, I do believe the idea of fundamental human rights is sensible.
Am I defending moral relativism, in the sense that one morality is no better or worse than another, by observing that morality is subjective and emotional? No, on the contrary. Even though I claim that morality is a subjective emotion, I also claim that one morality is better than another. And I think these claims are consistent with one another for two reasons.
First, I think that although morality is subjective in a primary sense, one can still judge moralities based upon objective standards. This is the topic of much of the rest of this article. Second, it is precisely the emotional aspect of morality that makes it kind of absolute. If morality were not absolute, it could not be a strong emotion. For most people morality is a very clear part of their emotional life and a strong guidance for their life. Without morality probably no civilization would be possible. It is not correct to say that because morality is primarily a subjective feeling, therefore one morality cannot be better than another. Moral systems are not equal to one another. They differ from each other in important regards and therefore they are not interchangeable or equally good. The morality that people should try to live peacefully together is a different morality than the morality that one should beat each other up. Most civilized people find the first morality superior to the second one and there is no reason they should not be allowed to feel that way and to act to rid civilization of the second morality.
Save a few sociopaths everybody will refrain from certain acts because they conflict with his conscience and thus with his morality. That applies even to thiefs and killers. A thief will usually not kill someone, even when it's to his advantage to do so. And a typical murderer will not murder anybody when it's to his advantage because he too has a, albeit diminished, conscience. And murders do in fact frequently have a problem with their conscience after they have murdered. Moreover, even someone who does something which most people think is immoral, will often himself think such an act to be immoral, especially if he is no longer in the role of actor. I once witnessed a thief, ironically, get morally outraged when someone stole his own car stereo.
Thus, morality is something which plays an important part in almost everybody's life. And most people are convinced that their morality, or at least a fundamental part of it, is the right morality. For example, I believe one should not kill innocent people, and I believe that morality is good and that I have the right to stop people with force who are about to kill innocent people, and that it is appropriate for me to condemn such behavior. And it has to be this way, because this is precisely the essence of morality. Having a certain morality means that you consider some acts to be absolutely bad and some other acts to be absolutely good. Morality may be subjective, in the sense that it is a judgement which can differ among people, but from the point of view of the individual it does provide an absolute distinction between right and wrong. If that were not the case the whole idea of morality would be nonsensical. For suppose that I think:
“Wait a minute, I believe murder is wrong, but I cannot prove that murder is objectively wrong, since the fact that I view murder as something bad is a subjective opinion and someone else might as well think differently about that. Thus, I cannot justify that my moral opinion, that murder is wrong, is better than someone else's opinion that murder is just fine. Thus, I cannot justify murder being wrong. OK, no matter how disappointed I am, I shall have to accept that I was wrong in my intuition that murder is wrong. From now on I shall now longer consider murder to be immoral. I may still find murder undesirable and I shall try to stop someone who would try to murder a friend of mine, that being in my own interest because I prefer my friends to stay alive, but I shall no longer morally condemn murderers or be mad at them, because there is no valid reason to be mad at them. From now I shall consider myself an amoralist.”
What's wrong with this reasoning? What's wrong with it is that it leads to a contradiction. The assumption at first is that I have a moral emotion and the conclusion is that I no longer have a moral emotion. Although it is in theory possible that someone might lose his moral emotions due to a certain insight, this is not in conformance with how most people actually are. From observation of people and cultures around us it is evident that almost all people have rather strong moral emotions. And it is the essence of moral emotions that morality is absolute. That is what it means to pass moral judgement and to have moral emotions. It means that you are positively convinced that what someone else does is good or bad. A moral emotion does not tell us: “Peter is a killer and I claim that that is bad, but I just as well might have said that it's alright”. On the contrary, you say: ”Peter is a killer and I believe that is very bad”, with no further qualification. One cannot have a negative moral judgement about someone and at the same time believe that that judgement is random and equally valid as some other judgement. If that were the case, then that moral emotion would vanish instantly. But how can I assume that murder is absolutely bad? Because that is my opinion. My own personal morality is an absolute and real division between good and evil for me, just as is the case for everybody else.
Despite the subjective basis of moral rules, in a certain sense one can say that one morality is objectively better than another morality. To be more specific, one can argue that the libertarian morality is objectively better than alternative moralities. The qualification “in a certain sense” is important, however. Without that qualification I do not think it can be argued that libertarianism is objectively better than communism, democracy, socialism, or whatever. The reason for this is that the concept of “better” is itself somewhat subjective. What does “better” mean? In order to determine that one thing is better than another, one needs a standard of what is good and what is bad. For example, can I claim that a particular building is objectively better than another specific building? No, I cannot, for first we would have to agree on a standard with which to judge that one building is better than another.
Once we agree on a standard, we can determine which building is objectively better. Possible standards are, for example: height, number of people that can work in it, number of cubic feet volume, resistance against earthquakes, durability, price or a clearly defined combination of factors. One building might be better according to one standard and another might be better according to another. Even so, the choice of standard is not totally random. The standard that a building that is more durable, other things being equal, than a another building, is a better building, is a better standard than the standard that the least durable building is better. Based upon reasonably objective grounds one can defend that some things are an advantage for a building, such as durability, cheapness, being found esthetically pleasing by most people, and other things are a disadvantage for a building, such as risk of collapse, expensive, being found ugly by most people, etc. Therefore, there is a certain amount of objectivity in choosing standards. The choice of standard is a combination of objective arguments and subjective elements based upon personal insights and preferences.
In the end not all people will agree exactly which type of building is better than other types of buildings, but to a large extent they will tend to agree, just as most men agree on which women are beautiful. The same, I believe, is true of morality. In order to judge which morality is better than other moralities we need a standard for what is considered better. For a large part one can give objective reasons why some things are an advantage for a morality and some things are a disadvantage. However, subjective preferences will also play a role. In the final analysis I believe one can present good arguments for the libertarian morality being better than any alternative moralities. Perhaps it is possible to prove that libertarianism is the best morality if one makes a few plausible assumptions; in the rest of this article I wish to make a start with that. But I do not believe it is possible to prove that libertarianism is the best morality period, i.e. without using the qualifications of "good arguments” or “if one makes a few plausible assumptions”.
David Friedman writes in his book “Law’s Order” [5] that he thinks that what people consider just is really largely an approximation of utilitarianism (maximization of the total utility or happiness of all people). In other words, utilitarianism is what people generally strive for as being moral. On first sight this statement might seem ridiculous (to libertarians). Surely murder isn't immoral just because the amount of happiness of the murderer associated with the act is smaller than the amount unhappiness (or loss of happiness) and grief of the victim and his friends and family? Surely the reason murder is immoral is that one does not have the right to the life or property of someone else, regardless of any utilitarian consequences? I think certain examples can illustrate that Friedman's idea, that there is an important connection between utilitarianism and morality, is true. I am referring to examples of the ”live boat situation” type. Those are hypothetical situations where people (libertarians) generally have the intuition that it is morally right to sin against libertarianism. These are the types of examples which make many libertarians uncomfortable, because they seem to show there's something wrong with libertarianism. However, I believe these types of thought experiments can provide us with a useful insight into the nature of morality.
Let's say I want to travel from A to B. I don't feel like walking too much, so I take a shortcut through the garden of Mr. Johnson instead of traveling via the road, even though I know Mr. Johnson is very keen on his privacy. Libertarians will say that I do not have the right to act this way and that therefore that act is immoral. But now suppose on the other side of Mr. Johnson's garden there is a small girl drowning in a pond. If I run through Mr. Johnson's garden I will be just in time to save her life. If I take the longer route around his garden, then I will be too late. Is it now still immoral to go through Mr. Johnson's garden? Most libertarians, I hope, will say: no. But what causes this difference? The only essential difference, I believe, is a difference in utility. The utility for me of trespassing on Mr. Johnson's property, in the case where I simply don't feel like walking a longer distance, is not too great. The utility for the girl of me trespassing on Mr. Johnson's property, in the case where I save her life by doing that, is very great. Undoubtedly much larger than any possible negative utility Mr. Johnson will experience due to his disliking my walking through his garden. Friedman provides more of these types of examples in his book “The Machinery of Freedom”.[6].
A critic might say there is no conflict because surely Mr. Johnson will not mind it if I run through his garden in the special case of saving a child. But we can always change the hypothetical example by assuming that Mr. Johnson is an egoist who cares nothing about children and still minds people traveling through his garden, even if they do so to save children's lives. Another counter argument might be that the act is not really lastingly damaging, because I can always be obligated after the fact to pay damages to Mr. Johnson. But what if it is impossible to pay damages? What if, for example, I steel a bicycle in a large city to save a child, even though I know I will probably not be able to find the original owner to give him back the bicycle later? Eventually, by changing the example as required, it will be possible to arrive at a situation where one does one person an enormous favor at the expense of a little bit of lasting damage to a third person. And the moral intuition of most people is that that is good. This demonstrates that a utilitarian advantage of an act is an important factor which can contribute to an act becoming moral.
How should we make moral choices in conflicts between the normal moral rules and utility in these types of special circumstances? Later on in this article I shall introduce the term moral ratio with the aim of acquiring more insight into these types of dilemmas.
What is the reason that in our culture the act of rape, for example, is considered to be so bad? I think the reason is that rape is something that is typically considered to be very displeasing to the victim, and which in some cases can even lead to years of psychological trauma. On the other hand the pleasure of the perpetrator is probably very short lived. Suppose that rape were generally just as displeasing to the victim as, say, stepping on her toe by accident and that it provided years of pleasure to the rapist. Then most people would probably be in favor of rape.
There are problems with the concept of utility, for example the problem of determining the utility of certain actions and situations. And some economists, such as Rothbard and Reisman, argue that utilities of different individuals cannot be compared. In his book “The Libertarian Idea” [7] Narveson presents a good discussion of these types of problems. Despite these problems, I still believe utility is a useful concept, because we do have a reasonable idea of what it means and how we can apply it to various questions.
A notable characteristic of libertarianism, I would say, is that it probably leads to the most wealth, compared to other political ideologies. Why this should the case can be argued with economic reasoning and by pointing to practice which demonstrates that the free market works better than any alternatives in all sorts of areas. I believe this connection between free markets and wealth is convincingly argued and demonstrated in thousands of libertarian books and articles.
So I think that theoretical arguments together with practical examples and analyses of free market versus regulation are sufficient to accept the tentative assumption that it is objectively true that libertarianism leads to the greatest prosperity. I wish to qualify this statement in two ways. First, objectively should not be taken to mean the same as it does in hard sciences such as mathematics or physics. This statement can never be proved or experimentally confirmed or falsified with the same degree of accuracy as statements in mathematics or physics. But I do think that in principle it can be argued in such a way that we get close to that kind of precision. Second, although at this time in history many people are not yet convinced that we have enough arguments for the statement above, it is very possible that in future the great majority of people will be convinced. For some arguments in this article I shall work on the assumption that my judgement concerning this statement is true, even though I shall not argue for it, because that lies outside of the scope of this article. For arguments I refer to countless publications in this area. Two well-known classics which I believe do a very good job at demonstrating the general economic superiority of libertarianism are “For a New Liberty” [8] and “The Machinery of Freedom” [9]. Also, there are thousands of books and articles defending the free market in terms of wealth and efficiency in more specific areas, such as protection, privatization, poverty and health.
Not only do I expect libertarianism to be the best system in terms of wealth, but also in terms of general utility or happiness. On one hand I believe this is a result of people being happier with higher productivity; money makes one happy. This can be deduced from the fact that when given a choice between a lower salary and a higher salary, other things being equal, people consistently choose a higher salary. But there are also many other non-quantifiable advantages of a libertarian society which are bound to make people happier than they would be in, say, a totalitarian society: harmony, security in justice, personal responsibility, respect for individuality, the joy of living in a moral society, etc. It is also important that in a libertarian society people earn their own money rather that their income being a mixture of what they earn themselves and what big brother provides them. Self-earned money is more psychologically rewarding than money unrelated to one's performance.
Libertarians not only claim that libertarianism leads to the greatest prosperity, they also claim that libertarianism is morally right. Some libertarians argue that libertarianism must primarily be accepted because it is moral and that the fact that most people will be most prosperous under libertarianism is no more than a happy side effect. They suggest it's some type of coincidence that the practical and the moral go hand in hand. I do not believe it is a coincidence. I believe there is a connection between morality and utilitarianism, as I have defended above. And I believe a choice between morality on one hand and pragmatism on the other hand may well be a false dichotomy. The very fact that libertarianism is practical is a major reason making it moral.
I believe that the basic moral intuition of most people is libertarian. Most people have, at least in part, the moral feeling that to damage someone else is bad. Even a brute primitive, or a modern Western ethnic cleanser, would not condone killing or robbing someone within his own group, even if he thinks it totally appropriate to do so against people from another group. Perhaps this moral intuition can be explained through evolution, although Harman, for example, notes that a good theory is this regard is still lacking [10]. The theory might be that groups with a libertarian morality will be more prosperous and more productive because they cooperate instead of fighting each other and therefore have a better chance of survival. But why this moral property should also give the individual a better chance of survival, which seems to be a prerequisite for an evolutionary theory, rather than only the group taken as a whole, is still a weak point. In any case, it is possible that the very reason people have developed a basically libertarian instinct is that libertarianism leads to the greatest prosperity.
What's special about libertarianism, apart from the prosperity aspect, is that it conforms to the universal moral intuition that one should not damage someone else. If you ask someone whether he agree swith the principle that people have a right to freedom and that one should not use force to dispose of the life of property of someone else, the answer usually is yes. The problem is only that people don't apply this principle consistently. A notable fact is that almost nobody is prepared to call taxes a form of theft or extortion. This demonstrates that it is generally not morally accepted to argue for control over other people's life or the fruits of their labor. People generally attempt, with poor arguments, to argue that taxes aren't really theft, but are in fact some kind of trade or voluntary democratic choice or something of that sort.
Even people who appear to be furthest away from libertarians, namely communist, defend their position in terms of freedom. Marx called for a liberation of the proletariat and his criticism of capitalism was that workers are oppressed. All communists after Marx have followed him in this rhetoric. Why oppression and infringement of liberty should be considered bad is not even argued. The reason for this, I submit, is that it's unnecessary, since this is assumed by almost everybody, libertarians and others alike, to be self-evident. Practically everybody (at least every Westerner) agrees that freedom is a good thing. That is so much taken for granted that no defense is necessary. Thus, the basic idea of libertarianism has already been accepted by most people. The only problem is that communists, at least the more naive communists in the West, mistakenly assume that capitalism is a form of oppression and infringement of liberties, whereas in truth the opposite is the case - capitalism is freedom and communism is tyranny. And that, I believe, is not a subjective opinion, but is something which can be largely objectively argued based on economical and logical reasoning. There exists a wealth of books and articles in this area. For example, in his book “A Farewell to Marx” Conway convincingly destroys the economic reasoning of Marx with regard to oppression and other things [11].
The question arises whether this is an argument for libertarianism being a good morality. It appears a circular reasoning. The reason libertarianism is moral is that most people think libertarianism is moral (at least in principle). Stated like this, it is indeed a circular reasoning. But one could also state that the fact that libertarianism conforms to a universal moral intuition is a clear advantage of libertarianism compared to all other moralities. Libertarianism is the morality that conforms best to the nature of the great majority of people. And that is an advantage on one hand because it is nice for all those people to live in a society that conforms to their moral feelings, and on the other hand because this indicates that a generally libertarian society is possible in practice. A society which goes against the moral feelings of the majority can not survive because too few people would cooperate with it, or at the very least it would function very poorly. It seems senseless to propose a morality which is in conflict with fundamental moral feelings of humanity, because that amounts to proposing a morality which is impossible to achieve in practice. One could argue that the current society is an exception to this rule. Our regulatory welfare state is in deep conflict with accepted moral values of freedom and property rights. However, the only reason this situation can persist is that this conflict is not generally noted.
What else is unique about libertarianism? The basic principle conforms to the Kantian principle that one should not use someone else as a means. If you do that, then you are using someone else for your own goals and are preventing him from pursuing his own goals in full. One could argue that sinning against the Kantian principle shows a lack of respect for the fact that every person wishes to pursue his own goals and thus has a need for autonomy. And even if someone does not want to be autonomous, but desires to follow somebody's leadership, then still such a person might want to choose for himself whether to follow the leadership of the Pope, God, Mao or whoever. Related to this is the Lockean principle of self-ownership, which comes down to about the same. The Kantian and the Lockean principles also conform to the moral intuition of most people. By arguing that libertarianism more or less follows from these types of intuitive principles one is thereby defending the reasonableness of libertarian morality.
Another defense of libertarianism arises out of the fact that the arguments for alternatives often lead to inconsistencies. Democracy is defended in the West as a high ideal of moral civilization. But further questions typically reveal that nobody truly agrees with the principle of democracy that what is moral is determined by the preference of the majority. One may feel that one should abide by economic regulation, for example, if it has been democratically chosen. But democratically murdering a minority will always be condemned. Furthermore, everyone will find some aspect of government policy unjust, even if it has been democratically chosen. My conclusion is that people do not really believe in democracy, but in fact do implicitly assume the existence of a more fundamental moral system which is preferable to democracy. Democracy is sort of a least of evils arising out of lack of knowledge of any better alternative. As Winston Churchill put it in his famous remark: “Democracy is a bad system, but I know of no better one”. In his book “Power and Market” Rothbard gives an excellent critique of democracy, mostly on the basis of all kinds of inconsistencies. [12]. One occasionally hears libertarians criticize some anti-liberty government policy as being undemocratic, or arguing for some libertarian policy as being more democratic than an existing policy. Apparently these libertarians think they can use the positive ring of the word “democracy” opportunistically when it happens to be to their advantage. I find this type of behavior in a libertarian unethical and contrary to the goal of freedom. Libertarians should always and consistently denounce democracy for what it is: an evil and immoral system of tyranny. For the same reason libertarians should stay away from the anti-concept of “political freedom”. There ain't no such thing as political freedom within libertarian thinking.
Although the principles of freedom and autonomy suggest one should not steel, murder, cheat, etc., one can ask how one can defend property of things not created by man, such as land and other natural resources. I think this can be defended reasonably well based on the Kantian principle that one should not use other people as means combined with arguments based on general utility.
An extended argumentation of this is outside of the scope of this article, but in summary such argumentation would come down to the observation that one cannot escape the necessity of a choice between some type of collective ownership and individual ownership. Now first, collective ownership leads to a situation where those with power can make decisions at the cost of those without power, while a situation with individual ownership avoids these problems and leads to a situation with greater individual possibilities and autonomy. Second, economic arguments can be given why individual property rights lead to greater efficiency and wealth. Third, collective property gives rise to states which in turn can lead to conflicts such as war. Fourth, within a system of individual property people have the most freedom to organize their societies as they wish. It gives individuals the option to pool their property with others in order to create the society of their choice. The opposite is not possible. Once property is collective, an individual cannot decide to become independent of the construction. Fifth, suppose there is an island where two tribes live who both occupy half of the island. Suppose one of the tribes multiplies excessively and has become twice as large after a generation, while the other tribe remains at the same number of people. With some type of collective property of the island, presumably every individual would have a right to an equal area of land. In that case the second tribe would have to give part of their land to the first tribe, that now has a collective right to two thirds of the island. That does not seem just. Therefore this example is an argument for libertarian property rights which would lead to each tribe keeping its right to half the island, regardless of population growth.[13].
Thus, various advantages can be given for a libertarian morality. There are practical advantages in the area of maximization of wealth and happiness. By the way, it is more accurate to say that libertarianism leads to a maximization of productivity rather than of wealth. A society where people work 12 hours a day may be wealthier than a society where people work 3 hours a day, but that does not prove that people in the first society are better of; leisure time also has value. The issue is productivity, or how many products people can by, on average, per hour worked.
I believe that a libertarian society is not only best in terms of maximization of utility, but also that it is the best system for most people. These two things are not exactly the same. It is imaginable that total wealth or happiness in a free market is largest because a small segment of the population is very very rich and happy. It is then theoretically possible that socialistic income redistribution, lowers total wealth and happiness, while making most people better of. However, I believe that such income redistribution is not possible in practice due to various political and economical reasons, of which Friedman mentions a few [14]. Therefore, it is not realistic to strive for income equalization.
Below I enumerate the advantages of libertarianism which I consider important:
1.
Libertarianism leads to the greatest average wealth per person in relation to the amount of hours worked.
2.
Libertarianism leads to the greatest happiness for the average individual.
3.
In a libertarian society most people are better of (richer and happier) than in any possible alternative society.
4. Libertarianism conforms to the universal moral emotions that one should not harm someone else, that one should not use another person as a means, and that everybody owns himself.
5. Libertarianism is clear and consistent.
6. One can argue that libertarianism conforms best to the nature of man.
7. One can argue that libertarianism conforms to a social contract which rational people would choose voluntarily if given the choice.
8.
Within a libertarian system all people have equal rights.
9. Libertarianism is no hypocritical morality.
10. libertarianism is the most universal system in that it allows the greatest variety of communities.
Items 1 through 4 have already been discussed above. I shall not discuss item 5 further. The other items are discussed below.
Ad 6. For a defense of libertarianism on the basis of natural rights see, for example, [15]. Later on I shall mention some more aspects of natural rights.
Ad 7. The idea that people should not steal, cheat, etc. can be taken to be some type of gentleman's agreement. This libertarian rule is to the advantage of most people. Therefore, most people would want to agree to this rule if given the choice. This observation is an argument in favour of libertarianism being moral, because one could say that it is not nice if people violate a reasonable rule. Those who violate the rule do receive the advantages of the rule (one is not robbed, etc.), but do not accept the disadvantages (one is not allowed to rob others, etc.). Even though there is no truly existing agreement or social contract, because it is a fictitious contract, one can still argue that thieves and others who violate the libertarian rule are not being decent. For a thief is better of in a society where people do not rob each other than in a society where everybody tries to steal from everybody else. Therefore it is logical to assume that even a thief prefers the libertarian rule to be accepted, even though that was not explicitly agreed upon by all people. Thus, it is in the thieve's interest that that agreement is treated as if it was actually made, but still he himself violates that agreement. That is hypocritical. One could view this as a sort of egoistic defense of libertarianism: libertarianism is morally good because it creates a society which is in most people's selfish interest. This looks a bit like the argument of objectivists for libertarianism. For a much more extensive and original defense of libertarianism on the basis of a fictitious social contract see, for example,
[16].
Ad 8. I think that the aspect of equal rights is a fundamental prerequisite of any good system of justice. The idea that a specific group of people has more rights than another group of people is random and therefore hard to justify. Furthermore, there is no good reason why all reasonable people, especially those within the lesser group, should accept such a system. Therefore, such a system would be instable. I believe this criteria alone makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to justify any system of justice based on a state. For every state is inherently based on the idea that one group (e.g. the majority, tax receivers, rulers) has more rights than another group (e.g. the minority, tax payers, subjects).
Ad 9. I think most non-libertarian systems of rights are based on a hypocritical morality and that it is an advantage of libertarianism that it is not hypocritical. For example, people in favor of taxation thereby condone theft, which they disapprove of under other circumstances. People in favor of democracy condone certain actions if the majority approves, while they condemn the same actions if the majority does not approve.
Ad 10. Although I do not agree with moral relativism, I also do not agree than one type of living is best for all people and all cultures. The fact that libertarianism allows the greatest variety of possible life styles makes it a universal moral theory. The libertarian institutions of property and freedom of contract and association create the possibility of all groups to have their own communities with their own rules. These communities can be separated physically, such as in the form of neighborhoods, or they can exist within a population, such as when we talk about the gay or the Jewish community. In fact, libertarianism allows communism, democracy, or any other political system, as long as people voluntarily agree to participate.
Thus, on the basis of various standards the libertarian morality is better than alternative moralities. I believe good arguments can be given why these standards are reasonable criteria for judging a moral system. I has not been my goal to provide a complete overview of all possible defenses of libertarianism. I have tried to provide an overview of the most notable advantages and arguments for libertarianism. Kinsella provides an interesting overview of three rational arguments on the basis of which it is presumably illogical to deny that people have (libertarian) rights. [17]. And of course many other usefull approaches have been written to defend libertarianism.
Some moral philosophers ask what reason people have to respect a certain morality. Why, for example, should a thief abide by the morality that one should not steel? Thus, these philosophers see morality as something that must in some way be justified by providing everybody a rational reason for abiding by it. I think this view reverses the issues. If we wish to defend the morality that people should not steel, the object is not to provide reasons for the thief not to steel - for a good thief with no conscience there is no rational reason not to steel - but the object is to give ourselves reasons to punish the thief, since we want to morally justify our own acts to ourselves in this regard.
Books such as Rothbard's “The Ethics of Liberty” [18] and Nozick's “Anarchy, State and Utopia” [19] are often criticized for presenting a libertarianism without foundations. That is partially true in that those books are more about the consequences and analysis of certain ethical norms than that they directly try to prove the validity of the ethical principles. But I find that to be a positive aspect of those books and for that reason I find them much more interesting to read than books such as “Liberty and Nature” by Rasmussen en Den Uyl [20] and “Persons Rights and the Moral Community” by Lomasky [21]. I think the false pretense these latter types of books have that one can objectively derive libertarianism (for example, a chapter in Lomasky’s book is called “The Derivation of Basic Rights”) makes them somewhat incomprehensible.
I would prefer libertarian philosophers to make an analysis of the advantages of libertarian morality and to give good reasons why libertarianism is a reasonable morality. That fits better with the nature of morality than the idea that one can prove the correctness of a morality, which is, in fact, impossible. My reasoning above implies that there is not one true foundation for libertarianism. It is not the case that one must choose between a foundation based on utilitarianism, natural rights, social contract, intuition, or whatever. I believe all these possible approaches have value and a defense of libertarianism must consist of a variety of arguments and advantages. I doubt strongly whether many people will be convinced of libertarianism on the basis of lengthy discussions about the derivation of rights and morality. I believe the process is actually closer to the reverse. First an academic is convinced of libertarianism because of its advantages and beauty. Then he writes a book to prove his morality using contrived arguments (which may in fact have the useful function of providing a kind of respectability within the philosophical/scientific community).
Kreuger asked the following question to the Ayn Rand Institute concerning natural rights:
Suppose there exists a species (an alien creature for example) that is a rational predator; it can only survive by eating other creatures. How does this species relate to man according to objectivism? Suppose these creatures wish to eat people and claim that they are thereby fulfilling their nature as predators and are therefore acting morally. Would that in fact be moral?
[22]
The answer of the Ayn Rand Institute was rather vague and came down to the observation that this is a very improbably scenario and that if such creatures did exist in all likelihood an alternative food would be invented so that nobody would have to be sacrificed. What I find interesting about these types of questions is that they indicate that specific foundations for libertarianism all have certain weaknesses and therefore are not convincing in all circumstances. This is another reason why it is usefull to have more than one argument for libertarianism. Together those arguments form a convincing collection of advantages of libertarianism, even though a specific advantage may not apply in all cases.
In this connection I think a book such as Atlas Shrugged by Ayn Rand [23] serves a very good purpose. Besides being a beautiful novel with an intriguing story with romance and heroism, this book presents a sublime defense of capitalism in the story form. All sorts of positive aspects of freedom are illustrated in a form which is closely related to people's actual lives, even if this is done in a highly romanticized manner. And that may make for a much better defense of libertarianism than a boring book with lengthy convoluted reasoning. If one can't write down a summary of one's arguments for libertarianism on a single page, then one's defense is hopelessly alien to the real world of people, for which libertarianism is meant after all.
Perhaps it is disappointing that the libertarian morality does not seem to hold in all situations, such as in the example of the drowning child. Even if one understands that a true morality cannot be objectively proved, it still would be a nice if it were possible to find a clear moral rule which holds under all circumstances and with which most people can agree, at least intuitively. Friedman's answer to this is that liberty is but one of several values which people have [24]. There are other values besides liberty, such as money, care for the poor, love, utilitarianism, etc. Viewed this way there is no fundamental difference between libertarians and most other people. There is only a gradual difference. Non-libertarians also value liberty, only to a lesser degree. They value highly other things which conflict with liberty, such as a guaranteed income for the poor. And between all those values they often make a choice resulting in liberty being sacrificed in order to attain other values (even though people are usually wrong about any positive consequences of sacrificing liberty).
The special thing about a libertarian is that he values liberty very highly, so that he is only willing to sacrifice liberty in exceptional cases. But can morality then still be defined by a fundamental principle? In the case of the drowning child we saw that a libertarian is willing to sacrifice liberty if there is a large utilitarian advantage to be gained. So, the connection between libertarianism and utilitarianism is as follows. Utilitarianism is an important value for most people. And it is logical that this is a value for most people since they care not only about themselves but also about others. And so they care about other people's utility. The fact that libertarianism maximizes utility in most cases is therefore an important argument for libertarianism. That leads to the libertarian rule that one should respect the life and property of others. But after that conclusion the rule itself becomes an important value for libertarians, on one hand perhaps because it is such a beautifully clear and consistent rule and on the other hand because it conforms to other important intuitions, such as the Kantian principle that one should not use other people as means. Next one observes that in certain extreme cases libertarianism and utilitarianism become competing values. It is a bit strange perhaps that utilitarianism is an argument for libertarianism, which then in some cases may turn around against utilitarianism. But this situation is not necessarily illogical, because utilitarianism is not the only argument for libertarianism.
And it is not always true that people want other people to be happy, which seems to be an assumption of utilitarian morality. There is such a thing as jealousy. In generaly that does not seem to me to be a healthy attitude. But I do think it's appropriate in cases of serious crimes. Although I generally wish other people well I would prefer that a cold blooded killer not go free and continue to have a pleasant life. I do not wish him that happiness. I am not talking about the fact that a killer on the loose is danger to others, that's a different aspect. I mean that I prefer the killer to be unhappy. The unhappiness of serious criminals is a value for me. Thus, for serious criminals I am in favour of a kind of disutilitarianism.
The intuitive rule seems to be that in general libertarianism has a higher priority than utilitarianism. If I steel a bicycle which I need very much, so that my gain in utility is higher than the loss of utility for the victim, a libertarian will still condemn the theft. On the other hand, as in the example of the drowning girl, if the gain in utility associated with an infringement of freedom is considerably larger than the loss of utility, then the infringement of freedom will be condoned. From this I propose that one can deduce that it is the ratio between positive and negative utility associated with an action which determines whether the action is good or bad. For this purpose I introduce the concept of moral ratio. A moral ratio defines the border between good and bad. Thus, if the positive utility of an infringement of freedom is 11 times as large as the negative utility, then the action is morally good if we assume a moral ratio of 10, for example. If the positive utility of the action is only 9 times as large as the negative utility, then the action is morally bad.
There are alternative definitions possible for the moral ratio. For example, one could consider the absolute difference in utility instead of the ratio. But the problem with considering the absolute difference is that this leads to inconsistencies. Say the border between a good and a bad action is taken to be an absolute difference of 10 utils. Suppose every day of the year I steel a bicycle that gives me 1.1 utils gain at the expense of 1 util loss for the victim. Then every day this action will be morally condemned. But all of those bicycles in one action of theft rather than spread out over a year, will give me 401.5 utils gain at a cost to the victims of 365 utils (assuming my advantage per bicycle is unchanged). That comes down to an absolute advantage of 36.5 utils, which is higher than the border of 10, which means the action should be condoned. But it doesn't seem logical that steeling 365 bicycles at once is good, while doing it on 365 separate occasions is bad. Therefore, the ratio seems the best criterion, since that avoids these types of inconsistencies.
Alright, so let's say the moral ratio provides us with a criterion for good and evil. But what is the correct value for that figure? The only objective rule one can state is that it must be greater than 1. First, because with a value lower than 1 utilitarianism would cease to be a value. For infringements of freedom would then be allowed which decrease utility rather than increasing it. Second, it would lead to contradictions. If my bicycle is stolen I would have the right to steel it back immediately, if the value of the bicycle is the same to me as it is for the thief. And both actions would be morally acceptable so that the rule would fail to determine who has a right to the bicycle. Third, the economy would no longer function due to an excessive erosion of property rights on which the economy depends. But other than this, the choice for a certain ratio is a subjective choice which indicates how one values freedom compared to utilitarianism. The difference between a socialist and a libertarian can then be said to be that a libertarian strives for a larger moral ratio than a socialist. (At least a socialist may think that he is sacrificing freedom for utility, while the result of his policies are a sacrifice of both freedom and utility. And actually, a socialist will typically deny that he is sacrificing freedom.). Further classification leads to 4 different kinds of moral ratios:
PEMR (Personal Egoistic Moral Ratio) - Minimum number of units of utility of myself which lead me to force someone else to sacrifice one unit of utility. Example: I walk through the garden of someone else to get to a doctor as soon as possible after an accident.
PAMR (Personal Altruistic Moral Ratio) - Minimum number of units of utility of someone else for which I voluntarily sacrifice one unit of my own utility. Example: I give directions to someone who is lost. With this ratio there is the complexity that I might actually become happier by helping someone else. Perhaps therefore it is better to speak of the sacrifice of economic value instead of the sacrifice of happiness.
SEMR (Social Egoistical Moral Ratio) - Minimum number of units of utility of someone else which leads me to morally approve of that person forcing someone else to sacrifice one unit of utility. Example: I morally approve of somebody walking through someone else's garden in order to get to the doctor as soon a possible after an accident.
SAMR (Social Altruistic Moral Ratio) - Minimum number of units of utility whereby I think someone else should voluntarily sacrifice one unit of his utility. Example: I morally disapprove if someone refuses to give a lost traveler directions.
Although the correct numbers for the 4 figures above cannot be objectively determined, it is possible to state a number of logical rules:
1. If PEMR is smaller than 1, then one is strongly immoral.
2. If PAMR is smaller than 1, then one is unwise.
3. It is desirable that all 4 ratios are greater than 1.
4. Ideally PEMR >= SEMR, SAMR >= PAMR en PEMR >= PAMR. If this holds for an individual he is morally honest, if not he is a moral hypocrite and that is probably the case for most criminals.
5. SEMR >= SAMR leads to consistency and SEMR < SAMR leads to a contradiction.
6. If for the majority of possible comparisons between an individual x and an individual y PEMR(of x) >= PAMR(of y) then society is peaceful. Otherwise society is violent. This rule holds only if people are rational.
7. If individual preferences for SEMR do not vary too much, then society is politically stable. Otherwise society is politically unstable. This rule holds only if people are rational.
I think these moral ratios can provide us with insight into the manner in which people choose between freedom and utility. More qualifications are possible. For example, people's moral ratio may be larger when the proposal is that people in the West should systematically pay money to poor people in the third world, than it is when the proposal is to help specific people near to us.
Most people will see rights as something which not only should be practical, but which also should be just or moral. The system of rights we choose should be consistent with the morality we choose. Still, rights are not exactly the same as morality. I think one can divide moral rules into two categories. We might call these strong moral rules and weak moral rules. Strong moral rules are rules for which someone thinks they should be turned into a right. Example: “Murder is not only immoral, it should also be forbidden.”, “Making sure your nuclear reactor is safe is not only moral, it should also be an obligation.”
Weak moral rules are rules for which someone thinks they should not be turned into rights. Example: “Making racist remarks in public is immoral, but it should not be forbidden.” Someone who agrees with this statement will feel that even though making racist remarks in public is immoral, forbidding those remarks is also immoral and possibly even more immoral.
The subject of weak moral rules is, strictly speaking, not part of the libertarian philosophy. The subject of libertarianism is politics, the question of what rights people have. Actions which do not involve rights are a question of personal morality and life style. Where I discussed moral rules in this article I meant to refer to strong moral rules. And those moral rules should conform to what is considered “just” and to the rights people are assumed to have. So the terms “morality” en “rights” are somewhat interchangeable. Although I could have based my text on the concept of “rights” I generally prefer to use the concept of “morality”, because I consider that a more fundamental concept. I think morality is seen by most people as a primary from which rights follow.
In exceptional “lifeboat situations”, such as the example given earlier about the drowning girl, it's possible that rights don't conform to what is seen as moral. I do not think that is necessarily a problem. Walking through Mr. Johnson's garden to save a girl's life may be a violation of rights (against the law), but most people consider it moral. If I pay damages to Mr. Johnson after the fact, there is still a move to conform to the rules of justice. If payment of damages is not possible for some reason, then the result is still good based on the assumption that in such a conflict between rights and morality, morality takes precedence. Another possibility would be to further adapt rights to morality. The rule could be established that it is not allowed to walk through someone else's garden without his permission, except in emergencies. An argument can be made for such a system, but it does have the disadvantage that it makes rights less clear, which undermines security in justice. And there is the danger of the slippery slope, with the risk that the libertarian principle will be eroded more and more (which indeed has happened in our society). I do think "lifeboat situations" are a marginal problem, because they are about exceptional situations. Ayn Rand has appropriately said that we should not base our ethics on lifeboat situations, because we do not live in lifeboats.
The May 1999 issue of Liberty featured a debate between the proponents moralism versus the proponents of so-called consequentialism. Moralists defend libertarianism on moral grounds (“aggression is immoral”) and consequentialists defend it on the grounds of its positive consequences (“libertarianism leads to prosperity, health, etc.”). I believe this is a false dichotomy, as for example Palmer also argues [25]. On one hand, says Palmer, consequentialism is a moral theory, because it says that those rules of justice are moral which have good consequences. By the way, Palmer does observe that consequentialism as such is not yet a complete moral theory, since it makes no statement about what are desirable consequences. (Utilitarianism is a specific form of consequentialism in that it further specifies the desired consequence as the greatest sum of happiness of all people.) On the other hand, Palmer observes, so-called moralists also attribute importance to consequences. Usually defenders of natural rights, for example, are seen as moralists. But their defense of natural rights is also based on consequences:
Modern natural law attempts to answer the skeptic who points out the great diversity in forms of human social life, and who asks “What's natural about X or Y, when we observe plenty of societies that don't follow X or Y?” Broadly speaking, thinkers in the modern natural law tradition respond by identifying certain basic goals they see as common to all or at least to most people (e.g., preservation of life, prosperity, enjoyment of the pleasures of life in peace, and so on). Then they show what rules or practices are necessary to achieve those goals. The form of the argument is the “hypothetical syllogism," i.e., “You desire X; in order to achieve X you must Y; therefore you must Y.” The rule of law, individual rights, property, freedom of contract, and other principles comprise consequentialist, natural law libertarianism. [26]
Boaz writes in this regard:
Human beings need rules to enable them to live together peacefully and productively. Libertarians believe that history, economics, reason, and the study of human nature indicate that the best results are generated by granting every person the freedom to use his own knowledge and his own resources for his own purposes. For most of us that is both a consequentialist and a moral analysis. And it is necessarily rooted in the nature of our species: no one would propose a natural-rights regime for bees or cows. [27]
And Yeager [28] observes that Rothbard, for example, defends natural rights in a kind of utilitarian way:
Since men can think, feel, evaluate, and act only as individuals, it becomes vitally necessary for each man's survival and prosperity that he be free to learn, choose, develop his faculties, and act upon his knowledge and values. This is the necessary path of human nature; to interfere with and cripple this process by using violence goes profoundly against what is necessary by man's nature for his life and prosperity. Violent interference with a man's learning and choices is therefore profoundly “antihuman”; it violates the natural law of man's needs. [29]
I believe these analyses and citations illustrate that there is no clear distinction between moralist and consequentialist arguments for libertarianism.
Once one accepts the libertarian principle of property rights, then the libertarian political policy with regard to main issues follows clearly from that: free market, no taxation, freedom of contract, drug legalization, no anti-trust regulation, free banking, no government monopolies, etc. However, even if one can argue well in favour of the libertarian principle, it is not objectively clear in all cases how libertarian principles apply. If one assumes, for example, that one should not harm someone else, then it seems reasonable to conclude that one should not create loud sounds near someone's property or pollute his environment. But if you apply these rules in an extreme way it would mean you are not allowed to breathe (carbon dioxide pollution) or talk (noise). It then seems reasonable that a little bit of pollution and a little bit of noise should be allowed. But where lies the border between what is allowed and what isn't? In some cases contracts may solve these issues, but not in all cases. It is highly doubtful whether objective borders can be found for all these kind of issues, so it is unavoidable that people will sometimes have to base their opinions on subjective preferences.
How does one apply the libertarian principle to issues controversial among libertarians, such as copyrights, animal rights, abortion and the question of whether or not someone who hires a hit man violates anybody's rights? Some libertarians try to find the answers to these types of questions by a chain of reasoning from a basic principle and then accept what follows from that. If reasoning shows, for example, that people who hire hit men cannot be held responsible or that copyrights are not justified, then one concludes “Well, we'll just have to accept that, even though these results go against my moral feelings”. I believe this amounts to misplaced dogmatism. The first error that is being committed is that it is forgotten or denied that accepting the libertarian principle is partially a case of moral emotion in the first place. And if one first accepts a principle, partially based on emotion, and then from that deduces something which goes against one's emotion, where does that leave the role of emotion? The second error is that one takes one specific formulation of libertarianism as if it were written in stone. Doing that assumes a degree of exactness which does exist in the hard sciences, but not in political philosophy. That makes political philosophy a very different kind of science than physics, for example. A main theme of this article is that reasoning about morality is indeed objective to a large extent. Some forms of reasoning are correct and others are incorrect. But there is a limit to this objectivity which is inherent to human social interaction. Human social structure just cannot be exactly defined, described, analyzed, or otherwise pinned down. You can get quite far, but in the end one will always come accross cultural and personal aspects, differences in interpretation and individual preferences.
Just as the border between allowable and not allowable noise cannot be determined exactly, so too it cannot be determined with total exactness which specific formulation of the libertarian basic principle is the right one. Taking copyrights as an example, one would probably argue that copyrights do not need to be respected if one formulates the libertarian principle as follows: anything is allowed except using someone else's physical property without his consent. Since copying is generally not an infringement of physical property, this means copying would be allowed. However, if one formulates the libertarian principle as follows: anything is allowed except using someone else's property or fruits of his labor without his consent, one could probably argue that copyrights should be respected, because copying entails using the fruits of someone else's labor. I believe with these types of small differences in formulations, it is often difficult to determine a-priori which of the principles is the best one. In the case of copyrights I would make my choice on the basis of two facts. First, respect of copyrights conforms to my moral emotion that this is fair, because it leads to a situation where producers are more able to reap the rewards of their own work. Second, I suspect that existence of copyrights leads to a higher general prosperity, because it better optimizes the economic incentives for writing books and articles. What I'm saying is that the method of deriving the correct rule from the basic libertarian principle with something like copyrights is invalid, because any result can arise depending on how one formulates the principle. Therefore the issue has to be considered in a more consequentialist manner, while moral arguments can remain an important factor.
I think utility and other consequences should play a large role in deciding these types of problems. First, because positive consequences by themselves are an important argument for choosing libertarianism. Second, with these types of issues one's intuitive feeling is often less strong than with issues that are clearer, such as murder and theft. When moral emotions become less important, it follows that utility is left as the important factor.
The way I view it, is that the choice of a political-moral position is somewhat of an interaction between principles and results. The positive consequences in terms of prosperity and happiness together with consistency with my moral intuitions and the beauty, simplicity and clarity of principle, lead me to choose libertarianism. But if next one starts to uphold this principle as an unchangeable dogma, then one is reversing the argument. One of the reasons for accepting the principle is the fact that it has positive consequences. Therefore, it is not logical to derive consequences from the principle and then to accept those without question, even if those consequences are not positive. In many cases one may choose to accept negative consequences, because for some reason one considers it moral, but one should not do that in all cases. I think on one hand you should sometimes qualify your principle on the basis of desirable consequences and on the other hand you should sometimes accept certain consequences because they follow from a basic principle which you judge to be good and aesthetical. Mutual feedback between principles and consequences continues until one is left with a satisfying combination of principles and outcomes.
Thus, I claim, contrary to many libertarians, that one cannot state that libertarianism is objectively true or right. One can give good arguments for libertarianism, but one cannot prove that it is “right”. Does that matter? I believe not. Suppose libertarianism were provably objectively true in some way. What good would that do? Not much, I would say. Because that's not what people care about. And that's not even what libertarians really care about. We want to live in a libertarian world not because it's right, but because it's beautiful and we consider it moral and because we think it will be the nicest place to live for ourselves and most others. And the same holds for the rest of mankind. They will choose libertarianism if they consider it beautiful, pleasant and moral. As long as they do not believe that they have no reason to choose it, even if they knew it was “right”. Thus, those who strive for a libertarian world must convince others that such a world is moral, pleasant and beautiful and not that such a world is objectively the correct system.
I also think you might be taken more seriously if you say: “I consider libertarianism moral because...” than if you say “Libertarianism is moral because...”. The first statement is something that can be respected and can influence someone in a positive manner, the second statement is arrogant. After you've made your statement, there are plenty of arguments you can advance for libertarianism. There is some debate between those who say that one should only defend libertarianism on moral grounds (especially objectivists) and those who say one should defend it on prosperity arguments. I think libertarianism should always be defended on both grounds.
Even though morality has a subjective element, it is very possible to offer moral arguments. For example, one can make use of the universal moral intuition of freedom and explain that libertarianism follows from this to a large extent. Furthermore, one can point out moral weaknesses in the current system. And one can analyze moral questions, for example by explaining that outlawing drugs limits people's freedom to make their own choices and that that's a form of patronizing. Or one can explain that economic regulation really entails people regulation. To Christians one can explain that the bible defends libertarian morality to a large extent, etc. And even just mentioning that libertarianism is moral, with no further explanation, can have an effect and make people think. Morality is a very powerful human emotion and it's important to make use of that. For example, if you want to get rid of rent control you will have little chance of finding passionate activists if you only base you call on economic arguments. If, however, you can convince people of the moral good of the call, you're likely to achieve better results.
In addition to that it is important to give economic arguments why the free market leads to prosperity and a regulated marked wastes wealth. And that the welfare state does not result in taking from the rich and giving to the poor, but in taking from both rich and poor. It is remarkable that I've never met a libertarian who did not agree that liberty leads to optimal wealth and prosperity. This suggests that arguments of utility do indeed play a large role in morality. Almost nobody will accept a certain morality unless he is also convinced that that morality will lead to prosperity and happiness for most people.
I do not think there is a clear difference between consequentialism and moralism, because consequentialist theories are also moral theories and moral theories, such as natural rights, are often based on consequences. The libertarian strategy should generally be to defend liberty on both moral and practical grounds, even though both are very much related. There is no one correct defense of libertarianism. It should be defended based on a variety of advantages.
I do not think a very dogmatic way of reasoning from libertarian principles is advisable. Dogmatism incorrectly assumes that it can be determined with great accuracy how libertarian principles should be formulated and applied. Therefore, such reasoning will be based on loose sand. In difficult cases positions should be based on a complex combination of moral ideas and practical aspects, while differences in interpretation and subjective preferences can never be totally avoided.
There is a clear connection between what people consider moral and utilitarianism. Libertarianism, I believe, is not only morally superior to any alternative, it is also the most utilitarian in most cases. Still, libertarianism and utilitarianism do sometimes conflict. I believe moral ratios can provide insight into such cases.
Even though morality is fundamentally a basic human emotion, I believe one can argue meaningfully about the best morality and I reject moral relativism. My conclusion is that it is reasonable to say that libertarianism is the best morality. There are good objective reasons for that. That is not the same as saying that libertarianism is objectively the correct morality. The final choice for a libertarian morality remains a personal choice and is therefore subjective. But, libertarian morality is well defendable based on objective grounds. So the question “Is there an objectively correct morality?” must be answered with no, but the question “Is libertarianism objectively the best morality?” can be answered with “yes” and “no.” “No” in the sense that what is the best morality in part depends on subjective preferences. “Yes” in the sense that it is the best morality on the basis of standards which reasonable people would choose. Libertarianism is the best way in which people can live together.
[1] L.A. Rollins, “The Myth of Natural Rights”, Loompanics, Port Townsend 1983.
[2] For a concise description of Ayer’s emotivism see, for example: Leo Fretz, “Ethiek als Wetenschap”, pp. 55-62, Boom Meppel,
Amsterdam 1980.
[3] Several conversations I had with Erik van Glabbeek about morality helped me form my ideas presented in this article.
[4] See, for example: Ayn Rand, Man’s Rights, p. 322, “Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal”, reprint by New American Library, New York (First print: Signet 1967).
[5] David Friedman, “Law's Order”, Princeton University Press 2000.
[6] David Friedman, “The Machinery of Freedom”, second edition, pp.
167-176. Open Court, La Salle 1989.
[7] Jan Narveson., “The Libertarian Idea”, pp. 150-153, Temple University Press, Philadelphia 1988.
[8] Murray N. Rothbard, “For a New Liberty”, revised edition, Libertarian Review Foundation, 2nd printing 1989.
[9] David Friedman, “The Machinery of Freedom”, second edition, Open
Court, La Salle 1989.
[10] Gilbert Harman, “Moral Relativism as a Foundation for Natural Rights”, p. 369, Journal of Libertarian Studies, Volume 4, Number 4, Fall 1980.
[11] David Conway, “A Farewell to Marx: An Outline and Appraisal of his Theories”, Penguin Books, London 1987.
[12] Murray N. Rothbard, “Power and Market”, second edition, pp. 189-199, Sheed Andrews and McMeel, Kansas City 1977.
[13] This reasoning based on the example of the island is due to Robert van Glabbeek.
[14] See for example pp. 104-108 and pp. 152-155 in: David Friedman, “The
Machinery of Freedom”, second edition, Open Court, La Salle 1989.
[15] Douglas B. Rasmussen en Douglas J. Den Uyl, “Liberty and Nature,
An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order”, Open Court, La Salle 1991.
[16] Jan Narveson, “The Libertarian Idea”, Temple University Press, Philadelphia 1988.
[17] N. Stephan Kinsella, “New Rationalist Directions Libertarian Rights Theory”, Journal of Libertarian Studies, Volume 12, Number 2, Spring 1996.
[18] Murray N. Rothbard, “The Ethics of Liberty”, Humanities Press,
Atlantic Highlands 1982.
[19] Robert Nozick, “Anarchy, State and Utopia”, Basic Books, New York
1974.
[20] Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl, “Liberty and Nature,
An Aristotelian Defense of Liberal Order”, Open Court, La Salle 1991.
[21] Loren E. Lomasky, “Persons, Rights and the Moral Community”,
Oxford University Press 1987.
[22] This is not an exact quote. See post on the email disussion list “vrijheid-list” (http://sturman.nl/vrijheid-list) by Marco Kreuger op on 22 November 1999.
[23] Ayn Rand, “Atlas Shrugged”, Random House, New York 1957.
[24] David Friedman, “The Machinery of Freedom”, second edition, p.
177, Open Court, La Salle 1989.
[25] Tom G. Palmer, “The Case of the Missing Premise; or, The Axiom That Wasn’t Categorical”, Liberty May 1999.
[26] Tom G. Palmer, “The Case of the Missing Premise; or, The Axiom That Wasn’t Categorical”, Liberty May 1999.
[27] David Boaz, “No Contradiction Between Rights and Consequences”, Liberty May 1999.
[28] Leland B. Yeager, “In Defense of Utility”, Liberty May 1999.
[29] Murray N. Rothbard, “For a New Liberty”, revised edition, p. 28, Libertarian Review Foundation, 2nd printing 1989.
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